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INTRODUCTION
0 wind of Tizoula, 0 Wind ofAmsoud!
Blow over the plains and over the sea,
Carry, oh, carry my thoughts
To him who is so far, so far,
And who has left me without a little child
0 wind! Remind him that I have no child.'
Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., 1978, UCLA School of
Law. B.S., 1967, University of Wisconsin at Madison.
1. Berber woman's song, in Gmtmas Gama, Smc ASam Dnsrui" 50 n.1 (1984) (citing
ELzKm WARmocK FmunA & BASMA QAxrAN BEZlRGAN, MIDDLE EAMN MUSIM
WoMEN SPn'aK (1977)). Greer's discussion of fertility concerns of women in the Middle
East, Africa, and India refutes the perception that infertility is a predominantly Western,
white, middle class concern. GRE.n, supra at 51 (commenting that "[t]he misery of the
childless women in most preindustrial societies can hardly be exaggerated"). See also
MART A ALBE TSON Fnqmv, Tim NE TrERE MOmTn, Tim SExuAL FAImY Akm
oTam TwmrNm CEnTURY TRAGEDms 218 n.38 (1995) (criticizing the perception of
infertility as "a primarily white concern"); Barbara Omolade, Looking Toward the Fu-
ture: Feminism and Reproductive Technologies, James McCormick Mitchell Lecture (Mar.
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It is hard for me to imagine sadder words than the cry of the Ber-
ber woman. I am infertile and for a long period of my life, I believed
that I was destined to remain childless. Like most infertile women, I
spent countless hours trying to conceive, culminating in a painful op-
eration after which I was told by my nurse that since I was 40, I was
"too old to have children" anyway. When I began to try to adopt, I
ran into new obstacles. There were so many things wrong with me: I
wasn't Christian,2 I was too old3 and too feminist.4 Every aspect of my
personal life was subject to intense scrutiny. As Patricia Williams de-
scribes the process: "I was unprepared for the fact that I too would be
shopped for, by birth mothers as well as social workers, looked over
for my age, marital and economic status, and race. All that was miss-
ing was to have my tires kicked."5
My story has a happy ending. I finally found an independent
lawyer and an adoption agency who accepted me as a prospective par-
ent, and after several birthmothers changed their minds about
relinquishing their babies, I was able to adopt two wonderful children
who enrich my life in ways I cannot begin to describe.
I am writing this Article because as a feminist I am constantly
surprised, and often angered, at the treatment of infertility in feminist• • 6
jurisprudence. There is almost no discussion of infertility as a
17, 1987), in 37 Butrxto L REv. 203, 220 (1988/89) [hereinafter Mitchell Lecture]
(stating that "the underdevelopment of the black working dass is tied directly to the re-
production and development of the white middle class through reproductive
technologies").
2. See, e.g., Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caringfrr Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and
Policy Must Change, 30 CoLum. J.L & Soc. PROBS. 327 (1997) (commenting that
many private adoption agencies require adoptive parents to be of a certain religion).
3. As open adoption, which permits birthmothers to select the adopting parents, be-
comes more common, the preference for younger parents becomes more pronounced,
because most birthmothers are young and view 40-year-old women as old enough to
be their own mother or grandmothers. See Nancy Gibbs, The Baby Chase, TmE, Oct.
9, 1989, at 86.
4. I was told by one attorney that he would not represent me because I had not changed
my name when I got married. Many other attorneys and agencies demanded that I
stay at home full time to take care of the child. When I told one attorney that my
husband planned to be the stay-at-home parent, I was told that was unacceptable.
5. Patricia Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEw ENG. L
REv. 913, 915 (1994) [hereinafter Williams, Spare Parts].
6. The topics of alternative reproductive technology and surrogate parenthood have
generated a great deal of literature in a variety of academic fields. Rather than at-
tempting to summarize all of this literature, I will focus my analysis on works of
authors who either self-identify as feminists or whose work embodies feminist meth-
odology or ideology.
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disability or as a painful experience for women. Instead, infertility
only appears as a part of extensive feminist analyses of new
reproductive technologies.7 Feminists have constructed a "grand
theory"8 of infertility and new reproductive techniques that has little
to do with reality. Much of the discussion of reproductive technology
is written in highly abstract, philosophical terms,9 rather than in the
more experiential, narrative style which characterizes much of feminist
jurisprudence.'0 The infertile woman is generally voiceless and
invisible in the telling of this story; when she does appear she is
dismissed or criticized. This Article is an attempt to begin dialogue
which incorporates her perspective into the discussion."
Throughout this Article I refer to specific schools of feminist thought, such as
cultural feminism or radical feminism, when the ideas I discuss can be attributed
primarily to that discrete group of feminists. On the other hand, I use the broader
term "feminists" without a descriptive qualifier when the ideas I am discussing are
shared by feminists from different groups.
7. See, e.g., GmN COREA, THE MOTHR MACHINE: REPRODUCTiVE T E HNoLOGY FROM
ARInFCIAL INSEMNTION TO ARTICuL WOMBS (1985); ISSUEs IN REPRODUCTvE
TEcHNoLOGY (Helen Bdquaert Holmes ed., 1992) [hereinafter IssuEs]; BARBARA
KATz RoTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TEcHNoLOGY IN A PA-
TRiARcHAL SocILrr (1989) [hereinafter RoTHmAN, RECREATING]; Norma Juliet
Widder, Society's Response To The New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Per-
spectives, 59 S. CAL. L REv. 1043 (1986).
8. Generally feminists are wary of highly abstract universal theories. See Frances Olsen,
Feminist Theory in GrandStye, 89 COLUM. L REv. 1147, 1156-58 (1989) (book re-
view) (defending theory in feminist jurisprudence).
9. See, e.g., CoRaE, supra note 7; RoTmAN, RECREATmG, supra note 7; Lisa C.
Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfirtile, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1007
(1996) [hereinafter Ikemoto, The In/Fertile]. The exception is Marie Ashe, whose
work is highly personal and experiential. See Marie Ashe, ZigZag Stitching and the
Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NovA L REv. 355 (1989)
[hereinafter Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching]; Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Dis-
course Holding Nature in Contempt, 22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 521 (1988) [hereinafter
Ashe, Law-Language].
10. See KathrynAbrarns, Hearing the CallofStories, 79 CAL. L REv. 971, 973 (1991).
11. As I discuss infertility in this Article, I will use the term to indude women who are
"socially infertile." The phrase comes from Marjorie Schultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood. An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIs. L
Rzv. 297, 314. This category indudes women who are biologically able to conceive a
child, but who lack a fertile male partner.
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I. THE FEMINIST STORY OF PATRIARCHY AND
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
A Patriarchal Wih for Reproduction
The majority of feminist authors who discuss artificial reproduc-
tive technologies' 2 argue that these procedures are bad for women."
According to their analysis, the technologies reduce women to
"mother machines," 4 breeders for the convenience of men's patriar-
chal desire to reproduce themselves. As one typical author puts it, "In
classic patriarchalism, the father is the parent .... Men have denied
significance to women's unique bodily capacity, have appropriated it
and transmuted it into masculine political genesis."" Radical feminists
argue that women are marginalized and used as guinea pigs by the
male medical establishment."6 They believe that modern technology
12. For a thorough explanation of the various types of assisted reproductive techniques,
see JoHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
13. See, e.g., CoREA, supra note 7; ANDRu Dwommnq, RIGHT WING WOMEN (1983);
EMI.Y MARTIN, THE WOMAN IN THE BODY: A CuLruaA ANALsIs oi REPRODUC-
TION 54-67 (1987); MISCONCEPTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHOICE
A THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES (Gwynne Basen et al.
eds., 1993); CHRISTINE OvERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION (1987);
JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE Ovm WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1993); ROTHAN, RECREATING, supra note 7;
BARBAtA KtTz ROTHMAN, THm TENTATIVE PREGNANCY (1986); PATRICIA SPALLONE,
BEYOND CONCEPTION: THE NEw Ponmcs OF REPRODUCTION (1989); Barbara Katz
Rothman, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective, 25
CREIGHTON L REv. 1599 (1992) [hereinafter Rothman, Feminist Perspective]; Mi-
chelle Stanworth, Birth Pangs: Conceptive Technologies and the Threat to Motherhood,
in CONFUCTS IN FEMImSM 228 (Marianne Hirsh & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990);
Wilder, supra note 7.
14. CoREA, supra note 7, at 312. Corea writes, "When reproductive engineers manipulate
the bodies of female animals today, they are dear, blunt and unapologetic about why
they are doing it. They want to turn the females into machines for producing
'superior' animals or into incubators for the embryos of more 'valuable females.'"
CoREA, supra note 7, at 312.
15. CAROL PATEmAN, THE SExuAL CONTRACT 216 (1988).
16. Many feminists premise this discussion on the assumption that the medical profession
is dominated by men. See CoRm, supra note 7, at 12-30. They also provide con-
vincing discussions of outrageously sexist attitudes on the part of many men involved
in reproductive technology. See, e.g., Coum, supra note 7, at 12-30; Ikemoto, The
In/Fertile, supra note 9. Among her other examples, Corea describes an instance in
which a doctor told a fertile woman with an infertile partner that he wanted to ex-
amine her. Without her consent or knowledge, he anesthetized her and injected her
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has created a reproductive brothel, in which women's reproductive
capacity is commodified and women's body parts are bought and
sold. 7 Ultimately, according to Andrea Dworkin, "[tlhe new means
will enable men-at last-to have women for sex and women for re-
production, both controlled with sadistic precision by men. " "
This picture of reproductive technology as the ultimate tool of
patriarchy relies on inaccurate assumptions which permeate the dis-
course and make all the corollary arguments questionable.' 9 The initial
problem with feminist theory in this area is the uniform usage of the
term "reproduction" as the subject of the debate. Use of this term de-
fines the exclusive goal of modern technology as an urge to duplicate
oneself, an urge which may indeed have patriarchal and racial impli-
cations.' The dialogue would sound markedly different if we
redefined the goal as "having children." The urge to have children is
very complex and not limited to a desire to see one's genetic makeup
reflected in a child. People want children for a variety of reasons, self-
ish and not so selfish;21 "reproduction" is only one of those reasons.'
If we begin to think in terms of "having children," instead of
"reproducing," it is easier to see the basic error in the dominant femi-
nist analysis: the explicit or implicit assumption that only men wish to
with the sperm of a medical student. Although she became pregnant and bore a child,
she was never told about the procedure. See CoREA, supra note 7, at 12.
17. See, e.g., COREA, supra note 7; DwomuN, supra note 13, at 181-88; Ruth Hubbard,
in Mitchell Lecture, supra note 1, at 210.
18. DwoRmrN, supra note 13, at 188.
19. The feminist view of reproductive technologies has also been criticized by nonfemi-
nists who do not share some of the fundamental feminist concepts of the nature of
patriarchy. See ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 220-35. My goal in this Artide is to
offer a feminist counterstory, written from the viewpoint of one who begins at the
same starting point as most of the authors I discuss.
20. For a discussion of the arguments regarding race and alternative conception methods,
see infra Part V.
21. As a prospective adoptive parent, I had to constantly articulate my reasons for want-
ing children. Like many adoptive parents, I found it difficult to explain my desire to
have children, even though the desire was very strong. The pressure to impress a third
party made this task even more difficult. For a discussion of the argument that
women's interest in having children is socially constructed, see infia Part I.B.
22. For an interesting discussion of the difficulty of inquiring into and judging a person's
reasons for wanting children, see Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means For
Reproduction: On Fxcessive Choice and Categorical and Technological Imperatives, 47
HASTINGS LJ. 1081, 1110-18 (1996).
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utilize assisted reproductive techniques23 Barbara Omolade's state-
ment is typical: "Every patriarch wants to reproduce the son." 24
Despite the uniformity of this assumption, none of the literature
cites any authority for the proposition that men desire children more
than women do, and no significant studies exist to support this con-
tention. In fact, I believe that the opposite is true; women constitute
the majority of infertile people trying to conceive or adopt a child.
Evidence indicates that women generally have a stronger desire for
children than men, and infertile women are therefore more likely to
pursue having children through new technologies or adoption.
A study performed with several hundred infertile men and
women led the researcher to conclude that "infertility affects women's
lives to a larger extent than men's." Much of the extensive literature
about infertility is aimed at a female audience.6 Stories about the pain
of infertility usually are written from the woman's perspective.2 ' There
are also indications that men and women experience infertility differ-
endy: men are concerned that something is "wrong" with them, while
women mourn their lost children.2s
Additionally, far more single women than single men adopt chil-
dren.29 While there may be several reasons for this phenomenon,
23. See, e.g., Coam, supra note 7; Hubbard, supra note 17, at 237. Only a few feminists
raise the possibility that women may be the primary people wanting to use the new
technologies, and even they dismiss this possibility with the "brainwashed mother"
argument. See infra Part I.B.
24. Omolade, supra note 1, at 219.
25. CmA HARKNEss, THE INFERTILITY Boom A COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL AND EMo-
noNAL. GUIDE 28 (1992).
26. Stories about infertility are prevalent in "women's magazines." See, e.g., Constance
Bohan, Why Can't I Get Pregnant?, McCALIs, Aug. 1995, at 44; Paula Dranov, New
Hopefrr Couples Who Can't Conceive, REDBooK, Aug. 1993, at 67; H. Dreher, You
Can't Let Pregnancy Become Your Sole Focus in Life, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Nov.
1993, at 78; A.T. Fleming, Forever Babyless, GLAMOUR, July 1994, at 160.
Additionally, there is a publishing house, Perspectives Press, which publishes
books about infertility, new reproductive techniques, and adoption. The sales litera-
ture appears to be directed toward women. See the brochure on file at the Michigan
Journal of Gender &r Law.
27. See, e.g., JEAN W. CARrE & MICHaEL CARTm, SwEET GRAPES: How TO STOP BEING
INFERTILE AND START LIVING AGAIN (1989); PATmCIA IRWIN JOHNSTON, TAKING
CHARGE OF INFERTILT 1-51 (1994).
28. One infertile woman writes, "It's Thanksgiving and I cry again. Mourning my un-
born child, not knowing if he would have had my husband's curly hair or my big
round eyes." HAmNzss, supra note 25, at 18. See also JOHNSTON, supra note 27.
29. According to the web site of the National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, only
one out of every ten members of the Committee for Single Adoptive Parents, a na-
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including obstacles to adoption faced exclusively by single men,3" this
statistic suggests that women may generally want children more than
men. In the context of foreign adoption (generally the only type of
adoption in which prospective parents are allowed to choose the sex of
their adoptive child) girls are in much greater demand than boys.31
While no one knows exactly why this is true, one of the most popular
theories is that women are primarily the parties who want to adopt
and women want daughters.
I have participated in adoption "workshops" in which prospective
parents are required to discuss their reasons for wanting children, and
it was clear to me that it was usually the woman who was most com-
mitted to the adoption. The adoption professionals I have spoken
with agree that generally the prospective mother is the driving force
behind an adoption. 2
The conclusion that having children is more important to women
than to men is also supported by the strand of feminist theory that
recognizes that women are more emotionally connected to their chil-
dren than men are.33 Women spend much more time taking care of
tional support organization, is a man. See National Adoption Information Clearing-
house, Single Parent Adoption: What You Need To Know (visited Apr. 7, 1998)
<http:l/www.calib.comlnaillpublicationslsingle.htm> [hereinafter Adoption Clear-
inghouse].
30. One information provider states, "Single men face even tougher scrutiny as they are
asked intimate questions about their sexuality, motives, friends, and living arrange-
ments. They may be qualified to parent and still be turned down." Adoption
Clearinghouse, supra note 29.
31. See ConsiderAdoptingBoys, OuRs MGAznu, Apr. 1985.
32. Interview with Ms. Beuerlee Einsing, Director of Education, Dillon International
Adoption Agency, in Tulsa, Okla. It could be argued that I am right about adoption,
but wrong about reproductive technologies. Adoption does not permit men to repro-
duce themselves, therefore it is not surprising that they are less interested in this
process.
33. The connection between women and children has been extensively discussed in femi-
nist theory. See, e.g., FNqmAN, supra note 1; Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings, Myth,
Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAT. REv. L & Wo EN's Su u. 133 (1992); Linda J.
Lacey, As American As Parenthood and Apple Pie: Neutered Mothers, Breadwinning
Fathers and Welfare Rhetoric, 82 Cov.NEI. L Rnv. 79 (1996) [hereinafter Lacey, As
American As Parenthood]; Robin L West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 140
(1987). If existing children are more important to most women than to most men, it
seems only logical that having a child would be more important to childless women
than to childless men.
My belief that women are more connected to their children than men may seem
to conflict with my rejection of the "biological feminist" emphasis on gestational
motherhood. But my assertion is based on the undisputed fact that women are
1998]
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their children than men3 and are more likely than men to want cus-
tody of their children after a divorce." Women are socialized to
become mothers, 6 while men are rarely socialized to become fathers.37
While I agree with mainstream feminists that many men do try to
control women through the reproductive process, 8 it is these men that
pose the real threat to women's autonomy, not reproductive technolo-
gies themselves. The technologies actually increase women's autonomy
because they permit women to have children without male partners."
Artificial methods of conception offer lesbian women (and gay men) a
previously unheard of opportunity to have children;0 an opportunity
socialized from birth to be mothers and men are not. I have not yet decided whether
I am convinced that women have biological differences that make them inherently
more nurturing.
34. This is true regardless of whether women stay home with their children or work out-
side the home. See NANCY E. DowD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMIuS
(1997) (demonstrating that in traditional families, women are, in essence, "single
parent" caretakers of the children); ARLE HOCHSCmLD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE
SECOND SHIFT. WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
35. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FNimw, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALrTY: THE RHETORIC
AND REA= OF DrvoRcE RuoRM 26 (1991).
36. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF WoMAN BORN: MOTmROOD As EXPER'INCE AND
As INSTITUTION (1976).
37. The traditional role of father has little to do with nurturing of children and every-
thing to do with "breadwinning." See Lacey, As American As Parenthood, supra note
33, at 99-100.
38. See Lacey, AsAmerican As Parenthood, supra note 33, at 106-08. I have argued else-
where that the rhetoric of the so-called "Father's Movement" masks a desire to force
women into traditional subservient roles.
39. Feminists who argue for more regulation in the area of artificial conception might
want to think very carefully about who will be actually making the desired regula-
tions. Legislatures will likely be influenced by the current political insistence that the
traditional nuclear family is the only desirable institution. For example, the state of
Oregon is currently considering a law which would prohibit single women from us-
ing artificial insemination by donors (A.I.D.). See Lacey, As American As Parenthood,
supra note 33, at 81. For an argument that restrictions on single women's access to
reproductive techniques are unconstitutional, see Linda J. Lacey, The Law ofArtificial
Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood in Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procre-
ate, 22 TULsA L.J. 281 (1987) [hereinafter Lacey, Law ofArtificialInsemination].
40. Lisa Ikemoto contends that -within the dominant parts of in/fertility discourses,
lesbians and gay men are virtually invisible." Ikemoto, The In/Fertle, supra note 9, at
1053. She does not discuss the possibility that many lesbian and gay parents who
have used artificial insemination may prefer this invisibility, given the current homo-
phobia affecting state legislatures. If it were widely known that lesbians use A.D. to
conceive, for example, it might prompt moves to prohibit their access to the procedure.
[Vol. 5:163
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they are taking in increasing numbers.4' As one commentator notes,
"assisted reproductive technology possesses the potential to radically
destabilize and disrupt the traditional conception of the family...."4
This resulting disruption can only benefit women's autonomy.
B. The Brainwashed Mothers Theory
In the rare instances in which they discuss infertile women, femi-
nists argue that the wish to have children is created by patriarchy and
is essentially forced on women.43 Women are stigmatized by infertility,
the theory goes, and made to feel worthless if they are childless.4
These feminists believe that the overemphasis on reproductive tech-
nology places a disproportionately high value on having children,
45
and that women, barraged by messages urging them to reproduce, ul-
46
timately have no real choice in the matter. In a typical argument,
Elizabeth Bartholet writes, "The current pursuit of IVF [In Vitro Fer-
tilization] is largely the product of social conditioning that makes
women think of themselves in terms of fertility and think of parenting
in terms of biological parenthood."47 Other commentators contend
41. See, e.g., APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HANDBOOIm CREATING
AND RA sING OUR FAMIIES (1993); JiLL S. POLLACK, LESBIAN AND GAY FAMmSu:
REDEFINING PARENTHOOD IN AmEmcA (1995); Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, supra note 9,
at 1055 (noting that the current popular literature contains some references to a
"lesbian baby-boom").
42. Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the Traditional Fam-
ily, 47 HASTINGS LJ. 951, 958 (1996).
43. See, e.g., CoanA, supra note 7; DwoumaN, supra note 13; PATEmAN, supra note 15.
44. See Linda S. Williams, Biology or Society? Parenthood Motivation in a Sample of Cana-
dian Women Seeking In Vitro Fertilization, in IssuEs, supra note 7, at 267 ("The fact
that infertile women often do experience feelings of guilt or inadequacy over their
supposed failure to fulfill this role expectation has been observed by many writers.").
45. See Lene Koch, The Fairy Tale As Modelfor Women's Experience of In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, in IssuEs, supra note 7, at 275.
46. For a critique of this approach, see Barbara Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile,
in CoNcwlITs I FEMINISM, supra note 13. A related argument is that women are not
told of the actual odds and expense of reproductive technology. See Elizabeth Bar-
tholet, In Vitro Fertilization: The Construction oflnfertility and ofParenting, in Issuns,
supra note 7, at 258 [hereinafter Bartholet, In Vitro Fertilization]. I completely agree
with this criticism and with calls for regulations that would require more disclosure.
47. Bartholet, In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 46, at 254. This is not to deny the indis-
putable fact that messages about the joys of motherhood are dominant our culture.
Bartholet gives a convincing example of an advertisement for an infertility clinic,
which states, "Before you let go of the dream, talk to us .... There's no other per-
fume like it, the smell of a newborn .... Tender, soft, totally trusting, a joy all your
1998]
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that "there are positive aspects of childlessness which are rarely men-
tioned, or are glossed over as selfishness."" Implicit in this type of
statement is a suggestion that the infertile woman is fortunate to have
escaped the trap of motherhood.9 As a result, infertile women are of-
ten dismissively told they should forget about having children. For
example, feminist Ruth Hubbard suggests, "Some strong, deep, femi-
nist consciousness raising might end up being far more therapeutic in
the long run than broadening the scope of the technological fix."50
The question of whether women raised in a predominantly patri-
archal society can ever act with true "free will" has generated a great
deal of philosophical debate. Catharine MacKinnon argues that patri-
archal culture is so universal and dominant that we cannot even
imagine what our lives would be like without its influence. 5 But just
because the desire for children may be shaped by patriarchy does not
make it unreal or unimportant. Regardless of the source of their wish
for children, most women find having children is an extremely posi-
tive experience.
When infertile women speak about their experience, they focus
on the children they want, not their failure to meet society's expecta-
tions. One woman writes, "Infertility is a silent tragedy. How do you
explain to someone that you had a rough night because there was no
baby to keep you awake, that your house is too clean and there are no
toys cluttering the floor? Would anyone understand that you cried
over Pampers commercials?" 52 Of course it is true that some women
who are ambivalent about having children are pressured into mater-
nity. However the mainstream feminist commentators' focus on
infertile women suggests that infertile women are more likely than
fertile women to be brainwashed into having children against their
own." Bartholet, In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 46, at 255 (citing a fertility center
advertisement in the Boston Globe).
48. NAoMI PFEFFER, REPRODUCTiVE TEcHNOLOGmS 83 (1991).
49. In contrast, Elizabeth Bartholet takes issue with the pressure for women to have bio-
logical children, not the desire to parent in general. See Bartholet, In Vitro
Fertilization, supra note 46.
50. Ruth Hubbard, The Case Against In Vitro Fertilization and Implantation, in Tin
CUSTOM-MADE CHu.D? WOMEN CENTERED PERSPECTIVs 259, 261 (Helen B. Hol-
mes et al. eds., 1981). Similarly, Barbara Katz Rothman scolds infertile women for
not moving on with their lives. See Rothman, Feminist Perspective, supra note 13, at
1605-06.
51. CATHARmN MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 126-54
(1989) (discussing male sexual domination of women).
52. HA~tmESS, supra note 25, at 17.
[Vol. 5:163
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will. Common sense suggests the reverse is true. Infertility provides a
reluctant parent with a perfect excuse for childlessness. Women who
persevere with artificial conception methods or adoptions are ques-
tioned and cross-examined about their desire to become parents" and
are necessarily highly motivated.
Some feminists argue that even if a subset of women thinks the
new technologies will be beneficial to them, development of these pro-
cedures must nevertheless be restricted because their use harms the
interests of women as a group.4 This argument relies on the premise
that, in addition to serving the patriarchal wish for reproduction, alter-
native conception technology and adoption reinforce the stereotypical
image of women as mothers." This argument is part of a continuing
feminist debate about the desirability of emphasizing women's unique
role as mothers. 6 While it is true that gender stereotypes can be
harmful, the fear of an essentialized "Earth Mother" image seems
unwarranted. 7 Today, the image of the strident "feminazi" is more
popular among antifeminists than the "Mommy" stereotype.
58
53. Most adoption agencies require prospective parents to discuss at length their reasons
for wanting to become parents, a surprisingly difficult task fertile people can avoid.
See EuzABnavn BARTHoLXr, FAMImy BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE Posrncs OF PAR-
ENNG 65-69 (1993) [hereinafter BARTHOLET, FAMILY BoNns].
54. One commentator notes, "Feminists critical of the new conception technology and
certain surrogacy and adoption arrangements suggest misguided violation on the part
of infertile women, a failure of will associated not with causing infertility, but with
seeking solutions for it deemed hazardous to other women." Margarete J. Sande-
lowski, Failures of Volition: Female Agency and Infertility in Historical Perspective, 15
SiGNs 58 (1990).
55. For discussions of the concern about stereotypes of women as mothers, see Mary Joe
Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different Voice?, 15
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 37 (1992); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the
Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1559 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Gender
Wars]; Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MicH. L. RLv. 797 (1989).
56. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, A FeministAnalysi of Adoption, 107 HARv. L Rnv. 913
(1994); Becker, supra note 33.
57. See Linda J. Lacey, We Have Nothing To Fear But Gender Stereotypes: Of Katie and
Amy and "Babe Feminism", 80 Comma L Rav. 612 (1995) (book review)
[hereinafter Lacey, Nothing to Fear].
58. Lacey, Nothing to Fear, supra note 57, at 640. Leslie Bender states:
If stereotypes are going to be used against us, as they have been in the past,
they will be so used regardless of what we say or do. Those who want to
exercise their power by disadvantaging women based on stereotypes did so
long before we celebrated women's cultures and will do so long after, no
matter which strategy we select in our struggle for justice for women.
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II. THE Focus ON ALTERNATIVES
Another common theme of feminist criticism of reproductive
technology is the argument that instead of concentrating on improving
reproductive technology or making it more accessible to prospective
parents, we should be concentrating on alternatives such as adoption or
eradication of the causes of infertility.
A. Adoption
Many feminist authors argue that the emphasis on reproductive
technologies detracts from the possibility of adoption.59 Ruth
Colker's statement is typical: "I wonder why people engage in IVF
at all .... There are always children available to be adopted....
Does the use of IVF express a disrespect for the lives of poor, dis-
abled, and often minority children who are available for adoption?"
6°
Although I agree with Elizabeth Bartholet that adoption is too often
presented as a "choice of last resort for infertile ... women,"6' I am
concerned that advocates of adoption gloss over the reality of its
difficulties. Each year in the United States there are approximately
fifty thousand infants available for adoption, but over two million
prospective parents waiting to adopt.62 I would certainly advise in-
fertile women who have the chance to adopt healthy infants to do
so, rather than suffer through painful infertility treatments that are
likely to be unsuccessful. 63 But that is not a realistic option for many
infertile women; not everyone is as lucky as I was. I was able to find
the lawyer who placed my first child because I was a "fellow" profes-
sional. In adopting my second child, I was fortunate to live in a city
with an agency that would accept clients over forty. Most adoption
Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and
an Ethic of Care in the Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1, 44 (1990).
59. The most prominent advocate of this viewpoint is Elizabeth Bartholet. See, e.g., BAR-
THoL= r,FAmm BONDS, supra note 53, at 24-38.
60. Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTNGS
L.J. 1063, 1080 (1996).
61. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 53, at 24.
62. See Lisa J. Trembly, Untanglng the Adoption Web: New Jersey's Move to Legitimize
IndependentAdoptions, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371 (1993).
63. The success rate of infertility treatments is very low. One authority puts it as less than
15%. See Naomi Cahn, Family Issue(s), 61 U. CHI. L Ray. 325, 341 (1994).
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agencies and lawyers are looking for a "Leave It To Beaver" family."
64. See Kleiman, supra note 2, at 344. Most adoption professionals state that they are look-
ing for relatively young, financially secure, well-educated, married couples. See Kleiman,
supra note 2, at 344. In addition, many adoptive parents must now meet the ideal crite-
ria of birth parents as well as agencies, since the increasing practice of open adoption
permits birth parents to select prospective adoptive parents. See Lois MLMs & SHARON
KALA RoszA, THE OPEN ADo'noN ExPaasmNcE 50-51 (1993).
Even "ideal" couples face agonizing waits for a healthy infant. The following
poem describes the process from the perspective of a social worker:
THE INTAKE INTERVIEW
A doset size interviewing room, windowless
and gray. A middle-aged couple steps in and
sits down. They both look at me, silent,
expectant, hopeful.
They want a baby.
The room is warm. Little beads of sweat are
forming on the mn's forehead. He would like
to comfort his wife. After a minute he puts his hand
over hers in her lap.
.. °......
The woman is slight and looks even smaller
as she shrinks in toward her husband.
She begins to shred a Kleenex with her fingers.
The ghost of her unconceived child
stares out at me from behind her eyes.
They have waited to see me for over two years.
I feel weary for these people. I know
their story already. Still, we move through
the desperate routine like
three haggard dancers.
.°... ..
They unravel the most private threads
of their lives to me, quivering
with the importance of this hour.
It is almost noon. I am hungry.
I am thinking that I know enough
of these people. I am ashamed
at not having more feeling for them.
........
The room seems warmer.
The man unbutrons his jacket.
They now offer their professional jobs,
their cultured hobbies,
their gardened suburban home.
"Just look," they are saying,
"See how worthy we are, how deserving."
1998]
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Women who are single,65 or divorced, or who have had psychologi-
cal problems in their past, find it difficult or impossible to adopt.6
Openly lesbian women or gay men also find adoption unlikely and
in some states even illegal.67
Many commentators acknowledge the difficulty of adopting
healthy infants, 8 but contend that it is necessary to restrict access to
"See how long we have waited."
"Look," I say back (in so many words)
"I would give you a dozen babies
if I could."
But I have little to offer.
There are no babies now,
I tell them.
I tell them that I will see
them again in another year. We will have
some more interviews.
They will fill out some more forms.
Maybe there will be a baby for them then.
The man's hair recedes a little further.
The woman feels another line sink
into her forehead. For a moment
they are silent, staring past me at
patterns on the wall.
When they leave
the door dangs behind them
Like an echo in a cavern.
Marilee Richards, The Intake Interview, in PEasvacrvs ON A GaMraD TREE 27-29
(Patricia Irwin Johnston ed., 1983) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES].
65. Although state laws generally permit adoption by single parents, individual agencies
often make marriage a requirement for placement. See supra note 64. Currently,
California's Department of Social Services is considering a proposed regulation,
which, if adopted, would effectively bar unwed couples from adopting. See Melisa C.
George, Tossed Salad. Diversiy Considerations in Adoptions, 21 L'w & PSYCH. RnV,
197, 215 (1997).
66. See Trembly, supra note 62, at 372 n.7.
67. Florida and New Hampshire explicitly bar any adoptions by gay men or lesbians. See
Kleiman, supra note 2, at 344-45. The Florida statute has survived a challenge in Cox
v. Florida Department ofHealth & Rehabilitative Services, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
Additionally, in states where agency policy requires that adopting couples be married,
gays and lesbians are effectively eliminated from the process. See George, supra note
65, at 215.
68. See, e.g., BARTioxzr, FAmILY BONDS, supra note 53, at 73-74; Colker, supra note 60,
at 1080.
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reproductive technologies, such as IVF and surrogacy, in order to en-
courage people to adopt hard-to-place children.' Martha Field argues,
"Children once considered to be unadoptable in this country are
finding adoptive homes these days, and the surrogacy system threatens
to reverse that trend. This would be a real social cost of promoting
surrogacy."' These commentators seldom discuss the fact that most
unadoptable children are either children with extremely serious, usu-
ally fatal illnesses such as AIDS, or older children who generally have
serious emotional problems." While adopting these children can be
enormously rewarding, it requires a tremendous amount of emotional
and financial commitment.72 Commentators never fully explain why
only infertile people should be forced to make that commitment in
order to have children.
Imagine a country in which a small percentage of the citizens
who are blind perform a task which no one else wants to do. When
the means to cure blindness appears, the sighted citizens argue that the
cure should not be given to blind people, for then there would be no
one left to perform the difficult task. Such an argument seems un-
thinkable, but it is disturbingly similar to the arguments for restricting
access to cures for infertility.
Forcing infertile people to adopt hard-to-place children by re-
moving alternatives is not only unfair to the parents, it is also unfair to
the children.73 Some experts challenge the presumption that adoption is
the best alternative for hard-to-place children, especially when it results in
separating siblings from each other.74 In addition, numerous studies show
69. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SuRuoGATo MoTHERPooD 56-57 (1988) [hereinafter FTLR,
Su aoGAT MormrmnooDl; Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts-Gestational and
Traditionak The Argument For Nonenforcement, 31 WAsHBURN LJ. 1, 6-8
[hereinafter Field, Surrogay Contracts].
70. Martha Field, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues, 25 CPuni-roN L
Rv. 1589, 1592-93 (1992) [hereinafter Field, Reproductive Technologies]..
71. See Troy Farmer, Protecting the Rights of Hard to Place Children in Adoptions, 72 IND.
L.J. 1165, 1165-66 (1997).
72. For an extended discussion of the difficulties of raising emotionally disturbed older
children, see generally D. Marianne Blair, Getting the Whole Truth and Nothing But
the Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongfdul Adoption, 67 Noum DAs L REv.
851 (1992) (documenting instances of older adopted children sexually abusing
younger siblings and setting fire to their homes).
73. See, e.g., ADopToN LAw AND PR.Ac'rIcE (Joan Hollinger ed., 1990) [hereinafter
ADopTION LAw]; Blair, supra note 72; Farmer, supra note 71.
74. See William Wesley Patton & Sara lat, Severing Hansel From Gretek An Analysis of
Siblings'Association Rights, 48 U. MiAmi L Rev. 745, 758-68 (1994).
19981
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
that adoptions of these children are often disrupted when "reluctant"
parents realize they are not equipped to handle the serious emotional
problems of older children.75 These interruptions take an additional
toll on the children. Unless there is careful screening of the prospec-
tive parents, hard-to-place children are at greater risk for child abuse. 6
The goal must be not only to find homes for hard-to-place chil-
dren, but to place them with families that want them. This goal can
be better met by adjusting existing policies which provide financial
and other types of aid to adopting parents, rather than restricting re-
productive technologies and leaving infertile parents with no other
options.77
For some feminist commentators, even adoption is not a desir-
able alternative for infertile women. While most feminists ignore the
subject,7 the perspectives of those who do write about adoption
range from approval79 to ambivalence80 to outright hostility.8' Our
Bodies, a classic feminist sourcebook on women's health, presents a
hostile image of adoption from the perspectives of both infertile
women and birth mothers.8 2 In its section on infertility, the book
disproportionately stresses the negative aspects of adoption, giving
the benefits of adoption for infertile women only cursory treatment.83
75. See Blair, supra note 72, at 882. Joan Hollinger notes that infertile "yuppie" couples
are not considered good prospective parents for emotionally disturbed children. See
ADOPTON LAw, supra note 73.
76. See Farmer, supra note 71, at 1172.
77. See Kleiman, supra note 2, at 366-67.
78. See BARTnior.er, FA my BONDS, supra note 53. Bartholet overstates feminist attitudes
toward adoption as being both hostile and silent. In fact, most feminists are simply
silent about adoption, and several prominent feminists actually write favorably about
it. See infra notes 79, 89.
79. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg. A Child-Centered Perspective
on Parents' Rights, 14 CADozo L Rnv. 1747 (1993) (advocating an approach that
focuses on the best interests of the child); BARXTOLET, FAmILY BONDS, supra note 53;
ADoPnON LAw, supra note 73.
80. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ. 293, 315-26
(1988); Cahn, supra note 63 (providing a comprehensive discussion of feminist atti-
tudes toward adoption); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Drafees: The Struggk For
Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L REv. 1415, 1418-22 (1991); Nancy Dowd, A Femi-
nistAnalysis ofAdoption, 107 HA~v. L REv. 913 (1994).
81. See, e.g., PHMUsS CHOeSLR, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M 109-46 (1988).
82. BOSTON Womm"S HEALTH BooK Cou.Ecavw, THE N w OUR BODIES, OURSELVES:
A BooK BY AND FOR WOMEN 346-51 (1992) [hereinafter OuR BODIES].
83. See OUR BODIES, supra note 82, at 509-11. Approximately one paragraph of the
section on adoption for infertile women discusses the positive aspects of adoption,
compared to several pages of one-sided descriptions of the negative feelings of adop-
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The book's discussion of options for women facing unwanted preg-
nancies presents adoption in an even less favorable light, describing
it as an alternative to abortion84 pushed by right-wing fundamental-
ists.85 The book presents the view that birth mothers coerced into
giving up babies for adoption suffer a "'cruel, but regrettably usual,
punishment that can last a lifetime,' while adoptive mothers attempt
,,86to keep birthmothers in the role of brood mares.
Our Bodies is not alone in its unsympathetic treatment of adop-
tive parents. Phyliss Chesler presents an even nastier picture of
adoptive parents, portraying them as spoiled, selfish people,"' many of
whom "have lost their moral bearings in their pursuit of a child."88
tees and birthmothers. The thrust of the discussion is an emphasis on the positive as-
pects of the search movement. Another chapter presents the standard negative
feminist view of reproductive technologies. See Ou BODIES, supra note 82, at 386-
93.
84. See OuR BODmS, supra note 82, at 345. In contrast to its ominous warnings regarding
adoption, the book's overall depiction of abortion is distinctly positive.
The book states: "For many women abortion is a positive choice. Having an
abortion can be much less traumatic physically and emotionally than having an un-
wanted child." Ous BODIES, supra note 82, at 345. The authors then devote an
entire chapter to explaining abortion procedures. See Ouix BoDms, supra note 82, at
353-85.
I do not disapprove of this emphasis on abortion. Like the book's authors, I am
pro-choice. However, it is important to remember that adoption is not always bad for
women and abortion is not always good. Women facing unwanted pregnancies are a
diverse group, and there is no one solution fits all" answer. Many women who relin-
quish their children for adoption do experience sadness and guilt for the rest of their
lives, but so do many women who have abortions.
85. See OuR BODIES, supra note 82, at 346-49. It is true that right-wing, pro-life litera-
ture often suggests adoption as an alternative to abortion. However, the goal of the
literature is to discourage abortion; encouraging adoption is only a means to accom-
plish that goal. The ideal conservative solution to reproductive issues is complete
abstinence from sex until marriage, which would virtually eliminate adoption.
86. Outt BoDms, supra note 82, at 348-49 (quoting Carole Anderson et al., Adoption
Abuse, Wo~mN-WIsE, Fall 1983). This statement is not supported by any empirical
evidence (the authors of this excerpted article are members of CUB (Concerned
United Birthparents), an organization that is extremely hostile to adoption).
87. See CmEsL s, supra note 81, at 125-39. Chesler writes, "Saints and altruists are usu-
ally in short supply; they are unfortunately not overrepresented among adoptive
paents... ." CHE L , supra note 81, at 123.
88. Cm.nsLEE, supra note 81, at 125. Chesler's extreme bias against adoptive parents is
illustrated by the fact that she discusses the case of Lisa Steinberg, who was killed by
her adoptive parent, as though it were a prototypical adoption. See CmsLR, supra
note 81, at 144-45.
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It is understandable and commendable for feminists to focus on
the suffering of birthmothers in the adoption process.89 Birthmothers
are often poor, young, and single,9" women who are indeed vulnerable
to exploitation. 9' But a true feminist analysis should also incorporate
the perspectives of adopted children, many of whom experience
adoption as a chance to belong to a loving family,92 and of adoptive
89. For a moving description of the experience of birthmothers written by a birthmother
herself, see Maureen A. Sweeney, Between Sorrow and Happy Endings: A New Para-
digm of Adoption, 2 YAI J.L & FEmINIsM 329 (1990). Ironically Sweeney is not
nearly as critical of adoption as some non-birthmother feminists; the primary thrust
of her artide is toward reforming adoption, not abolishing it.
90. Some feminist commentators view encouragement of adoption as an attack on single
mothers. While I agree that our society is outrageously hostile to single mothers, I
think the primary goal of conservatives is to force single mothers into marrying, not
into relinquishing their children for adoption. See Lacey, As American As Parenthood,
supra note 33, at 91-108.
91. An example of this perspective is the work of Mary Anne Cohen, a birthmother who
is active in CUB. She writes:
I was afraid
Because I swallowed lies-their bitter taste
Remains, taints the years, poisons silene ...
Because
I was only Following Orders, only
Being what was wanted,
A nice, sweet, Catholic, obedient, passive
Female Fool-
I was afraid
To trust my heart, my guts, love-bond
To say No.
To defy, refuse to comply
with what my beaten soul knew to be
Unnatural Crime--
Denial of Feeling, of Blood, of Truth
Severance
Of sacred tie.
Mary Anne Cohen, Confesion, in PERspEcrivE, supra note 64, at 36-37. But see
Sweeney, supra note 89 (presenting the perspective of a birthmother who believes the
decision to relinquish her child was the right choice for her).
92. This poem by an adopted child exemplifies that perspective:
You chose me to be your child
And took me when others could not care for me
You cherished the life I had been given
By someone unable to nurture me
You were willing to feed me, clothe me, shelter me
Most of all you gave me someone to belong to
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parents, who are not exploitative monsters.93 As open adoption be-
comes more common, many adoptive parents remain in touch with
You sought me out and became my parent
You wanted me--you needed me-and I needed you
You talked to me, read to me, hugged me
Kissed me goodnight and let me dream with you.
You helped me to grow
You were the tooth fairy, Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny
You were there with band aids and medicine too
At birthday parties, picnics and holidays
Trips to the park, the library, the zoo
You were at school plays, at camporees and graduation
I had you to walk and talk with
Sometimes you went without to give to me
You always shared-you always cared
You chose me and gave me identity, pride and family
You gave me your name-you are my parent.
Virginia Cain, The Chosen One, in PESPEcTvs, supra note 64, at 133.
93. I know many adoptive parents who think constantly about our children's birthmoth-
ers and recognize the enormity of the sacrifices they have made. The following poem
captures this perspective:
It's my child's birthday today
He just went dashing by me
His eyes are sparkling with the excitement
only meant for today
Presents, kisses, hugs, cake, ice cream-
It all seems so natural
It's a day for looking back and looking
forward.
It's my child's birthday today
But there's something very different
happening inside of me
This should be a day of complete joy
A day for thanksgiving
But I'm stopped in the midst of all
this excitement
I'm stopped because my thoughts are with
"someone" else for a time.
It's my child's birthday today
I have no memories of his life growing
inside of me and fighting to be released
I have no memories from the beginning months
of his life.
Another "someone" was there
Another "someone" suffered for my joy
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the child's birthparents and send pictures and reports of the child to
the birthmother." Many adoptive parents actively support their chil-
dren's search for their biological parents." As one expert writes,
"Adoption can be a life-enhancing experience for all triad members; or
it can be a negative and embittering choice. There are no absolutes in
adoption, no guaranteed reactions, no universality of needs and feel-
ings."
96
B. Remedies for Causes oflnfertility
Other feminist commentators argue that infertility has social
causes which can be remedied and that addressing infertility in con-
junction with broad societal treatment of women and people of color
It's my child's birthday today
But "someone" somewhere is feeling emptiness inside
I wonder if she is wondering-
Wondering who he looks like
Wondering how big-how small
Wondering if he laughs much
Wondering if he will wonder someday, too.
It's my child's birthday today
And in the midst of this blessed day
that was given to me
I have a prayer
Oh, God that I may never forget that "someone"
suffered so much to give life to my child.
That "someone" loved my child so very much in
that she gave him the right to live. May I
never forget for a moment and especially now,
today, to offer a prayer of thanks for that
"someone", and that you, dear God, can always
be there by that "someone" to help her through
the hurts she will have when she stops to think
that today is "my child's birthday." Amen
Sue Westrum, A Birthday, in PERsPECrrVEs, supra note 64, at 92-93.
94. If the adoption is an open adoption, all parties may know of each other's identities,
and in some situations the birthmother may remain in contact with the child. Even
in more traditional adoptions, birthmothers generally are given profiles of informa-
tion about adoptive parents and select the parents they want for their child. See, e.g.,
MELnA & RoszA, supra note 64, at 223-30.
95. See Linda Babb, Divided We FalLP, ADoPTIV FxiAmms, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 56-57.
96. Johnston, Introduction, in PERSpEcTnVs, supra note 64, at 20.
[Vol. 5:163
INFERTILITY AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
should be our primary focus.' These commentators contend that
since techniques such as IVF are primarily available to middle class
white women," we should concentrate on nonclassist remedies that
will help everyone, such as providing better care after childbirth and
abortion and removing environmental and occupational conditions
which may cause sterility.99 Laura Purdy argues "[d]e-emphasizing 1VF
to concentrate instead on those social factors is therefore not to aban-
don infertile women, but rather to take a different approach to the
problem. Already infertile women may lose out, but those who would
have become infertile due to social factors will benefit."'tu
I completely agree that programs to help reduce the root causes of
infertility are desirable. But the argument that our society must choose
between alternatives creates a false dichotomy. Purdy states we must
choose between helping people who currently suffer from infertility,
and developing programs to prevent it, but she never explains why.'
Most of the money to develop and use artificial conception comes
Shsources; e money to remedy social causes of infertility
will need to come from the government.
Infertility is not limited to the wealthy, but affects people of all
classes and races." The head of a Planned Parenthood clinic writes:
97. See, e.g., PATnMAN, supra note 15 (discussing patriarchal use of female reproductive
capacity together with prostitution and sexual slavery); Omolade, supra note 1, at
249-55 (situating infertility in the social context of racism and sexism); Nadine
Taub, Surrogacy: A Preferred Treatmentfir Infertiliy, 16 Law MAD. & HMT CAR
89 (1988).
98. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HAsTGs L.J. 935
(1996) [hereinafter Roberts, Race]. After documenting her contention that very few
black women use alternative conception methods, Roberts concludes that "Black
women in particular would be better served by a focus on the basic improvement of
conditions that lead to infertility, such as occupational and environmental hazards,
diseases, and complications following childbirth and abortion." Roberts, Race, supra
at 948. For a response to Roberts, see Rao, supra note 42, at 952-56 (calling for a
constitutional analysis of reproductive technology).
99. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 97.
100. Laura Purdy, Children of Choice: Whose Children? At What Cost? 52 WAsH. & LaE L.
RL,. 197, 213 (1995).
101. See Purdy, supra note 100, at 223-24.
102. Most medical experiments in the area of artificial conception are funded by private
foundations. The actual use of the methods themselves is, of course, funded by the
patients, usually without insurance compensation.
103. Infertility increases with age, which should be of particular concern to feminists, since
women who pursue careers are more likely to postpone childbearing until they are
older. Some right-wing commentators portray infertility as the cost women have paid
for feminism. Carol Sanger describes this attitude as saying, "'serves you right' to
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There is a widespread belief that only upper-middle class,
professional people have fertility problems. This is simply
not true. Many low-income people who do not have medical
insurance come to our clinic seeking treatment. They des-
perately want to have a child, but are without financial
resources. I think this segment of the infertility population is
largely ignored and forgotten. °4
Restricting reproductive technologies in favor of hypothetical,
long-run solutions, would effectively mean turning our backs on the
people who need help the most. If insurance companies were required
to provide coverage for infertility treatments such as IVF, then poor
women would be able to use the techniques. '1 6
III. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE GESTATIONAL MOTHER THEORY
Certain aspects of cultural feminism have been described as
"biological feminism," a theory which emphasizes women's capacity
to bear children as part of their essential nature.'"' A few proponents
of this genre seem to suggest that a child must be biologically con-
nected to its mother for the mother-child bond to be real or
women who come to the idea of motherhood late." Carol Sanger, M Isfir the Many
Things, 1 S. CAL REv. L & WoMEN'S STUD. 15, 53 (1992).
104. HARmESS, supra note 25, at 42.
105. Many medical companies exclude any form of assisted reproduction from their cover-
age. See HAcwrss, supra note 25, at 39. At least ten states have passed legislation
regarding insurance coverage for infertility treatments, but insurance companies con-
tinue to resist extending their coverage, despite an estimate that infertility
expenditures account for less than one percent of total health care costs. See HARic-
NESS, supra note 25, at 41.
106. Elizabeth Bartholet argues strenuously that we should oppose state laws which would
require insurance companies to cover infertility treatments, since such coverage would
"subsidize" infertility techniques at the expense of adoption. See BARTHOLT, FAMILY
BoNDs, supra note 53, at 211-17. This argument appears to be at odds with her
professed concern for lower-class women, who will be disproportionally affected by
lack of insurance coverage.
107. See, e.g., Patricia Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L Rav. 803, 837
n.128 (1990). This description is often applied to the works of Robin West. See, e.g.,
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. Ray. 1 (1988). In contrasting
men's and women's experience of autonomy, West gives as her primary example
women's experience during pregnancy. This has led to criticism that she has created
an "essential" earth-mother woman.
[VCol. 5:163
INFERTILITY AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
meaningful.' °8 The argument of "biological feminists," that the gesta-
tional mother's claim of motherhood is superior to anyone else's,' 9
supports a general conclusion that contested surrogacy situations
should be resolved in favor of gestational mothers. In the adoption
context, this approach favors the rights of the biological mother.10
Naomi Cahn suggests that the feminist jurisprudence same-
ness/difference debate"' can be played out in the context of adoption
and child custody."' She suggests that since "difference theorists cele-
brate women's capacity for intimacy and bonding as distinct from
those of men," difference feminists will support the rights of biologi-
cal parents; sameness feminists, on the other hand, "emphasize the
capacity of all parents for nurturing," and therefore are more sympa-
thetic to nonbiological parents."' Cahn's analysis provides an accurate
overview of the current feminist literature. However, there is a third
possibility: the recognition that mothers are generally closer than fa-
thers to their children ' 4 applies to all mothers, not only gestational
mothers.
A classic example of the biological feminist approach is the work
of Marie Ashe. In her article about surrogacy, Ashe states that dia-
logue about surrogacy has been dominated by "legal discourse that
fails to recognize certain experiences that, for many women, are con-
stitutive of knowledge-perhaps of truth-and of personhood.""' She
108. See, e.g., Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 547-57; Barbara Katz Rothman,
Daddy Plants a Seed. Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47 HsnGs L.J. 1241, 1247
(1996) [hereinafter Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed]; West, supra note 33, at 140.
109. See, e.g., Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 547-57; Field, Reproductive Technolo-
gies, supra note 70, at 1594-96; Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed, supra note 108, at
1244-46. This argument is made even when the gestational mother is not the genetic
mother. Sociologist Barbara Rothman states that the genetic tie is associated with pa-
triarchy, while in a mother-based system "the blood tie is the mingled blood of
mothers and their children." Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed, supra note 108, at 1245.
110. See Cahn, supra note 63, at 334-35. Cahn provides a sophisticated analysis of differ-
ent feminist perspectives on adoption.
111. See Cahn, supra note 63. For an overview of this debate, see, for example, Joan C.
Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Es-
sentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DtKE L.J. 296.
112. See Cahn, supra note 63.
113. Cahn, supra note 63, at 333.
114. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 33, at 135-42.
115. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 525. More specifically, she asserts that medical,
contractual, and law and economics discourse has dominated the discussion. Ashe's
artide was written in 1988; she might not make the same statement today with the
rise of feminist discussion of the issues.
1998]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
calls for narratives from women, a call I would normally applaud.
However, her idea of dialogue is limited to "women who have, in
[their] own bodies, experienced maternity."" 6 These apparently are
the only women whose voices count, who might have anything to
contribute.
17
Although she dismisses infertile women as participants in the dis-
cussion she envisions, Ashe does purport to address their situation.
She divides women into two groups-those who have experienced
"equilibrium" by bearing children through their bodies and those who
have not."' Women who cannot have children through the traditional
biological process, according to Ashe, "establish relationships with
children through acts of cultural structuring.""' Although they can
never be real mothers because they have not experienced pregnancy,
they can, through a "cultural construct" became sort of inferior, sec-
ond-class parents who "participate in the continual process of bonding
and separation that defines all parent-child relationships." 20 Later, in
discussing non-gestational mothers, Ashe states "[w]hile such
'parenthoods' never rise-separately or in conjunction with each
other-to the level of maternity asserted by a woman whose body has
actually constituted the child's developmental process, each may"-to
the degree it does not contradict the child's well-being-deserve some
respect." 2' The relationship of the non-biological mother to the child
is compared to that of "adult lovers-being characterized predomi-
nantly by desire,"" while the superior "intimacy of the child and
mother-in which the maternal body wholly surrounds, contains and
nourishes the child's whole being.., can be characterized as exceed-
ing the intimacies of adult loves."'2
3
Every time I try to summarize this theoretical nonsense, I feel an
almost overwhelming sense of rage. The suggestion that I and other
116. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 526.
117. Similarly, Ashe writes, "The self-accounts of mothers and of all women-pregnant,
birthing, aborting, suffering violations or growing in power-constitute utterances
closer to the reality of women's experiences than does any formulation of law or of
medicine." Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching, supra note 9, at 382. Apparently, the accounts of
infertile women do not constitute "reality" in Ashe's world.
118. See Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 545.
119. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 545.
120. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 545.
121. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 558.
122. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 551.
123. Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 551.
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non-gestational mothers have only constructed ourselves as mothers is
both absurd and insulting.'24 Since the birth of my children, I have
engaged in the same activities as any other mother. I have changed
their diapers, cared for them when they were sick, sung them lullabies,
driven them to soccer and voice lessons, shared their triumphs and
defeats, and loved them with a love I cannot even begin to describe. I
do not just imagine that I am Elisabeth and Michael's mother, I AM
their mother.
I do not deny that pregnancy provides the first instance of intense
bonding with a child. 5 However, there are many experiences that
contribute to this bonding, most of which are not unique to gesta-
tional mothers. I am also aware that the relationship between adoptive
parents and children can pose unique problems, and that many adult
adoptees describe themselves as "incomplete" or "unfulfilled" because
of lack of contact with their birthmothers.'2 However, the adoption
literature I have read indicates that it is most often the genetic paren-
tal ties the child seeks, not the birthing ties."' Adoptees speak of the
need to find someone "who has my eyes, my love of basketball," not
the one who bore them in her womb. 8 If these accounts are repre-
sentative, then it is the genetic mother who has the strongest claim to
the real bonding relationship. Yet Ashe is equally dismissive of genetic
mothers who are not gestational mothers, describing their contribu-
tion as "minimal."'29 .
124. It might be argued that Ashe's artide, which is about surrogacy, does not apply to
adoptive mothers like myself. However, her emphasis on the supremacy of the gesta-
tional mother's bond with the child dearly applies to adoptive parents as well. See,
e.g., Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 544-59.
125. Many of my friends who have experienced pregnancy disagree with Ashe's idealized
account of the pleasures of the condition.
126. See, e.g., Lois RusEin MELNA, RAInING.ADOPTED CHIDREN (1986).
127. See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES, supra note 64; JoHN TRisELIOTIS, IN SEaRCH OF ORIGINS
92-108 (1973).
128. One adoptee writes in a poem to her birthmother.
And now do you ever wonder like I do...
If my eyes are like yours?
Nearsighted? Lapis blue?
Are you thin like me?
And is the little finger on both your hands
Just a bit crooked like mine?
Sue Walker, To Mama, in PERSPECTrVES, supra note 64, at 118.
129. Ashe, Law-Language, supra, note 9, at 548. Ashe views the contribution of the genetic
mother as even less significant than that of the contractual mother. See Ashe, Law-
Language, supra note 9, at 548.
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If Ashe's analysis were correct, then anyone who does not experi-
ence life through the traditional biological processes can only
construct an experience. For example, Ashe's logic suggests that lesbi-
ans who do not make love the traditional biological way have only
constructed themselves as lovers.1
30
The privileging of the relationship of the mother and child in the
womb is also problematic for pro-choice feminists.'31 An emphasis on
the strength of the bonds formed between unborn children and the
gestational mother could be used to make the point that pro-life advo-
cates have been making all along-that from the moment of
conception, fetuses are equally capable of thought and emotion as
born babies. Pro-choice feminists generally contest this argument,
32
and often contend that it is the live, born child who is most deserving
of society's protection. Yet, the cavalier dismissal by biological femi-
nists of the ties children form with their non-gestational mothers after
birth belies this assertion.
IV. ARGUMENTS ABOUT SURROGACY
Consistent with biological feminists' focus on gestational
mothers, much of feminist literature on surrogacy focuses primarily
on the exploitation and autonomy of the surrogate, gestational
mother, ignoring and even condemning the needs of the infertile
Many feminists argue additionally, that the emphasis on a genetic tie is simply
another example of patriarchal domination. As Barbara Rothman puts it:
In a patriarchal system, when people talk about blood ties, they are talking
about a genetic tie, a connection by seed. In a mother-based system, the
blood tie is the mingled blood of mothers and their children: children grow
out of the blood of their mothers, of their bodies and being.... The ma-
ternal tie is based on the growing of children; the patriarchal tie is based on
genetics, the act of impregnating.
RonmrA , RECREATMG, supra note 7, at 34; see also Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, supra
note 9, at 1025-27.
130. I am not suggesting that Ashe would make this argument; in fact, I am sure she
would strongly disagree with it. However, her natural/unnatural parenthood dichot-
omy is disturbingly reminiscent of the homophobic statement that gay lovemaking is
"unnatural."
131. The vast majority of women who self-identify as feminists are pro-choice, including
most of the authors I have discussed. See, e.g., CoaEA, supra note 7, at 238; Ashe,
Zig-Zag Stitching, supra note 9, at 383.
132. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 60, at 1067; Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 55, at
1595-1623.
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woman.' The traditional form of surrogate motherhood, exemplified
in the Baby M case,m is a situation where a man artificially
inseminates a woman, who becomes pregnant and bears a child. Thus
she is both the gestational and genetic mother of the child.
As technology has advanced, surrogacy relationships have become
more complex. For example, in a California case135 a genetic mother
was unable to carry a child to term. Her eggs were implanted in the
womb of another woman, who was the child's gestational mother.3 6 It
is also possible to have scenarios where three separate mothers are in-
volved-intentional, genetic, and gestational.' 7
Surrogate parenting may appear at first glance to be a classic ex-
ample of patriarchal domination of women. Even commentators who
might acknowledge that women are more eager than men to use
A.I.D. or IVF, point to surrogacy contracts as clear cases of men
wishing to reproduce themselves.'38 Much of the relevant literature
reduces the complexity of surrogate relationships to a dyad-the man
wishing to duplicate his genes versus the gestational mother, who is
used as a vessel for his desires. The third party-the woman whose
133. Most feminists object to the term "surrogate mother," arguing that it implies the
gestational mother is not the child's real mother. See, e.g., CrwLpa, supra note 81, at
8-9, 51-54; Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 546-47, 559.
134. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). The court in the Baby M case held that the
surrogate contract was invalid, because it was a form of baby-selling and generally vio-
lated public policy. However, the court eventually awarded custody of the child to the
biological father, rather than the surrogate mother. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
135. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d776 (Cal. 1993).
136. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. After the gestational mother refused to relinquish her
claim to parental rights, the court was forced to determine which woman should be
considered the child's legal mother-the genetic mother or the gestational mother,
the court ultimately awarded custody to the genetic parents. It stated that the woman
who intended for the child to be conceived was the appropriate person to be consid-
ered the mother. This case has been the focus of many feminist critical race theorists,
because the surrogate mother in the case was black. See infra notes 195-201 and ac-
companying text.
137. For a thorough discussion of the possibilities of reproductive technology, see ROBERT-
soN, supra note 12, at 97-145.
138. See, e.g., ConA, supra note 7, at 3-4, 288-317; Field, Surrogacy Contracts, supra note
69, at 7-8, 16-17.
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infertility made it necessary for her partner to turn to a surrogate 139-
is generally invisible.
40
Both of the underlying assumptions regarding non-gestational
parents are too simplistic to be accurate. Many infertile women, far
from being mute bystanders, may see surrogate motherhood as a
chance to have the children they desire. Moreover, if men were really
singularly obsessed with reproducing themselves, they could simply
take the Henry VIII approach, replacing their infertile partners 4' with
new women able to give them heirs.
142
Literature about surrogacy focuses almost exclusively on the sur-
rogate mother. Her perspective is the center of the feminist debate
about the desirability of enforceable surrogate contracts. Many femi-
nists argue strongly that surrogacy is classist and racist, because of
their belief that surrogacy arrangements allow poor women to be ex-
ploited by financially secure women and men." They also argue that
a woman cannot possibly make a decision about whether to give up
her baby until after the child is born.'"
Not all feminists agree with these theories. A well-developed
counterargument among liberal feminists states that women are in fact
empowered by the freedom to make contracts.' These feminists see
139. Of course, every surrogate parenting case may not have a third party. A "socially in-
fertile" man without a partner, especially a gay man, may want to use the procedure.
But to date, the most common cases of surrogacy involve married couples where the
wife is infertile.
140. When the intending mother is discussed at all, it is usually in connection with the
biological father. For example, Marjorie Schultz writes, "It is less frequently noted...
that if specific performance is denied where a surrogate refuses to surrender the child,
an analogous loss is sustained by the father and indeed, by the adoptive couple."
Schultz, supra note 11, at 366. Ironically, the only work I have found which discusses
invisibility refers to the surrogate mother. Review, The Invhible Woman, 108 H-tAv.
L Rnv. 953 (1995) (reviewing JoHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILD.EN OF CHoIcE: FRa-
DOM AND T- NEw REPRODucrrvE TECHNOLOGIES (1994)).
141. True, beheading is no longer an option, but unilateral, no fault divorce is nearly uni-
versally available.
142. Some people might argue that this is exactly what a biological father is doing with a
surrogate mother, but it is the prospective father's desire to stay with the woman he
married that precipitates the need for the surrogate mother.
143. See, e.g., FIELD, SuRRoGaTE MOTHERHOOD, supra note 69, at 25-32; Ikemoto, The
In/Fertile, supra note 9, at 1037-41.
144. See, e.g., CssasSt, supra note 81, at 109-14; FIELD, Sunno, m MOTHEfHOOD,
supra note 69, at 69-70; Ashe, Law-Language, supra note 9, at 545-46.
145. See, e.g., Loui ANDRtEws, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHES, ExPECTANT
FATw AND BAvE NEw BASin 11-94 (1989); CARMEL SHAuLv, BIRTH PowER:
Tm CASE FOR SuRRoGAcY 120-23 (1989); Schultz, supra note 11, at 310-15.
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attempts to "protect" surrogate mothers as paternalistic, reinforcing
stereotypes of women as overly emotional and unable to make rational
business decisions. Additionally, this argument criticizes the empha-
sis on the mother-child connection as one that "reifies a woman's role
as biological mother, treating it as the one role that is of the es-
,,147
sence.
Each approach is incomplete. The liberal theory is flawed by its
failure to understand the strength of the bond the gestational mother
may feel toward the child she has borne, but the "surrogate as the only
victim" approach is also flawed, by its failure to understand the
strength of the bond the intentional mother feels toward "her" child.
Elizabeth Kane, one of the first surrogate mothers, provides a more
complete view of the complex situation: "[S]urrogate motherhood is
nothing more than the transference of pain from one woman to an-
other. One woman is in anguish because she cannot become a mother,
and another woman may suffer for the rest of her life because she can-
not know the child she bore for someone else.,
148
While studies seem to repudiate Kane's assumption that every
surrogate mother feels the kind of pain she describes, 49 her statement
at least recognizes the anguish of the infertile prospective mother. In
contrast, most surrogacy discussions that mention the infertile
woman depict her in an extremely negative light. For example, I
have yet to see a sympathetic portrayal of Elizabeth Stern, the pro-
spective adoptive mother in the infamous Baby M case."' She is
146. SeeANDREWS, supra note 145, at 11-94; SHALFv, supra note 145, at 120-23.
147. Schultz, supra note 11, at 384.
148. Euz.~rm KINE, BirTH MOammu THsu STORY OF A, slcA'S FpT LEGAL SuaRo-
GAE MOrER 275 (1988).
149. According to Lori Andrews, only one percent of surrogate mothers regret their deci-
sion. See Jean M. Sera, Surrogacy and Prostitution: A Comparative Analysis, 5 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L 315, 324 (1997) (citing Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood The
Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAw MED. & H.ATH CARE 76 (1988)); see also Daniel
Goleman, Motivation for Surrogate Moms Ranges fiom Guilt to Gratitude, ST. PETERs-
BuRG Tuas, Jan. 25, 1987, at IF (noting that fewer than one in one hundred
surrogate mothers are believed to refuse to have given up their babies and that only
one out of ten surrogate mothers requires therapeutic counseling after relinquish-
ment).
150. In an entire Georgetown Law Journal symposium devoted to the Baby M case, ap-
proximately three sentences mentioned the perspective of the prospective adoptive
mother, generally in a negative way. Colloquy: In Re Baby M, 76 Gao. LJ. 1717
(1988).
151. In contrast, much of the feminist literature on the subject of the Baby M case is
devoted to defending Mary Beth Whitehead. I do not mean to suggest that this
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consistently pictured as cold, unfeeling, and completely selfish.'52 Her
anxiety that a pregnancy might be dangerous because she had multiple
sclerosis, 53 an extremely serious disease, is dismissed as a mere excuse.
I have no first-hand knowledge of any of the parties in the Baby M
case, so I have no evidence that this portrait is wholly inaccurate. But I
doubt that many of the commentators on the case actually knew
Elizabeth Stern.'' Much of their hostility seems to stem from the fact
that she was a successful doctor.'55 When this same phenomenon-
condemnation of a woman for her professional success-occurred in
the Anita Hill case, 6 feminists justifiably reacted with outrage.
In addition to being viewed as the ultimate example of a patri-
arch's urge to duplicate himself and maintain power over women,
surrogacy is criticized as exploitative of poor women.' 58 There is un-
sympathy is misplaced. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that surrogate contracts
should provide an opportunity for the surrogate mother to change her mind. See
Lacey, Law ofArtificiallnsemination, supra note 39, at 281.
152. See CHrSL.R, supra note 81, at 24 (questioning Elizabeth Stem's "self-diagnosed"
multiple sclerosis; ignoring the fact that Stem, like Whitehead, was a woman in pain;
portraying her as an androgynous, emotionless figure, not really a woman like Mary
Beth Whitehead; and describing Stem as "pale, gaunt, accomplished, incredibly nar-
row at the wrist, waist, pelvis, and ankle, the most 'masculine' (i.e. the least
emotionally expressive) of Baby M's four parents . .. "); Katha Pollitt, The Strange
Case ofBabyM, THEn NATION, May 23, 1987, at 667, 682.
153. See In Re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
154. Chesler relied on hearsay evidence of unidentified neighbors to describe the Sterns as
aloof, nasty, and supercilious. See CHaER, supra note 81, at 28.
155. In deploring the fact that some women took the side of Betsy Stem instead of Mary
Beth Whitehead, Chesler quotes a commentator's portrayal of the two women as
"two sides of the same coin .... Whirehead is passion where Stern is mind. White-
head is blood, tissue, guts, need, sex. Stem is intellect, control and alienation.
Whitehead is mother, Stem is career." CSsLER, supra note 81, at 23. Women prefer-
ring Stem are described as "male-identified... mother-hating." CHSLER, supra note
81, at 24.
156. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues in the Hill-Thomas hearings, see RAcE,
GENDER, AND PowER rN AMERICA (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds.,
1995) [hereinafter RAcE, GENDER].
157. One commentator noted, "Anita Hill was suspect on so many levels. Had she been
too successful in her own career, possibly at the expense of black men?... She had
no children either, and so had failed to fulfil her 'proper' role as a mother." Adele Lo-
gan Alexander, "She's No Lady, She's a Nigger': Abuses, Stereoypes, and Realities from
the Middle Passage to Capitol (andAnita) Hih in RAcE, GENDER, supra note 156, at
3, 17. Note the parallels to Chesler's implied criticism of Elizabeth Stem for being a
career-only woman and not a mother. See CHOLEm , supra note 81, at 23.
158. See Mary Ruth Mellowen, An Incomplete Picture: The Debate About Surrogate Moth-
erhood, 8 HAtv. WoMEN's LJ. 231 (1985). The issue of exploitation is often linked
with the issue of racism. However, the exploitation issue is limited to surrogacy, while
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doubtedly a great deal of truth in this argument. 59 As many feminists
have acknowledged, white middle-class women exploit poor women of
color in many ways, primarily to perform domestic duties for them. 16°
The more relevant question may not be "Does this practice exploit
poor women?" since arguably most aspects of our capitalist, patriar-
chal society exploit poor women,' but rather "Does this practice
constitute an unusually cruel exploitation of poor women?"
At this time, our data on surrogate mothers is too limited to pro-
vide a definitive answer to that question. But interviews with many
surrogate mothers indicate that they feel genuine satisfaction from
bearing a child for someone else.'6 1 Only one out of one hundred sur-
rogate mothers refuses to relinquish her child,' 63 which suggests that
while relinquishment is a heart-wrenching experience for some moth-
ers, many find that the rewards of relinquishment outweigh the
pain.16 Additionally, the available data on surrogate mothers indicate
that the income gap between gestational mothers and prospective
adoptive parents is not as great as might be imagined; one study shows
the average adoptive couple's income is $55,000 and the average sur-
rogate mother's family income is $32,000.165 In addition, the majority
of surrogate mothers are married and have been pregnant before.' 66
These data suggest that the question of exploitation is complex. Some
women may prefer to earn money through a surrogacy arrangement
which allows them to stay home with their children, rather than
working at low-income jobs outside the home that may damage their
health and well-being.'
67
race issues permeate discussions of other alternative means of forming a family, such
as IVF and adoption. Therefore, I will discuss racism issues in a separate section of
this Article. See infra Part VI.
159. For a comprehensive treatment of many aspects of exploitation, including a thorough
discussion of surrogacy, see John Lawrence Hill, Frploitation, 79 CORNELL L REv.
631 (1994).
160. See Martha P, Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to
CatharineMacnnon, 5 YAx J.L & FEMImSM 217,239-42 (1993).
161. See, e.g., Mimi ABR4owrrz, UNDER ATrACK, FIGH NG BACK: WoMEN AND WEL-
FARE IN TH UNrED STATES (1996).
162. See Amy ZucKwauN Ov _avou,, SuRRoGATE PARENTmIG 119-27 (1988).
163. See Hill, supra note 159, at 695.
164. See KAm, supra note 148, at 218-19.
165. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 389 n.309.
166. See Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding Against the Oppres-
sion ofSurrogaqy, 8 BEmELEY WOmEN'S LJ. 29, 37 n.23 (1993).
167. See Lucie E. White, No Fxuit Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 Gao. LJ. 1961 (1993).
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Another possible answer to the concerns about surrogate parent-
age is that the practice of surrogacy is so limited that it cannot have
the massive effect people envision. While the grand theories of racism
and classism might have some validity if surrogate contracts were pur-
sued on a widespread basis, this is simply not the reality. Surrogate
cases are numbered in the hundreds, not the millions.' 6' Surrogacy is
generally the last option infertile people consider, with its use limited
to people who cannot or do not want to adopt, '69 or who cannot con-
ceive through some other method.' 70
The argument that surrogacy is far too limited to produce huge
numbers of lower-class "breeders" 7' is generally met by the assertion
that if surrogacy were universally legalized,"z we would see an on-
slaught of upper-class white women able to conceive and bear healthy
children instead hiring poor women to have their babies for them.'7
This is an argument that I frankly find astonishing-a classic example
of theory run amuck. Martha Field declares, "Others, however, may
choose surrogacy out of mere predilection or convenience-fear of
pregnancy, a desire to stay thin, a desire to pursue career choices that
seem incompatible with pregnancy, for example."'74 The hostility to
168. By the end of 1986 there were only 500 recorded cases of surrogate arrangements. See
FeLD, SURROGxTE MOTmHOOD, supra note 69, at 5. Between 1980 and 1987,
fewer than 25,000 women contacted surrogate agencies to inquire about the process.
See Hill, supra note 159, at 694 n.334.
169. Noel Keane, a well-known "broker" for surrogate arrangements, has predicted that
surrogacy will replace adoption. See Field, Reproductive Technologies, supra note 70, at
1592. However, there is no evidence that this prediction is accurate.
170. As reproductive technology becomes more sophisticated, this number' will undoubt-
edly decline.
171. Gena Corea envisions a "reproductive brothel" in which most women would "be
defined as 'nonvaluable' and sterilized and in this way, their progeny culled ....
Certainly women of color would be labeled "nonvaluable" and used as breeders for
the embryos of 'valuable women.'" CoRm, supra note 7, at 276. For a discussion of
embryonic transfer in cows, see CoRAa, supra note 7, at 69-79. Corea later suggests
that women will be treated the same way. CoREA, supra note 7, at 272-82.
172. Currently, some states ban paid surrogate contracts completely. See, e.g., AiZ. Rav.
STAT. ANN. § 25-218 as amended 1989 Act (West 1956); D.C. CODE ANN § 16-402
(1995); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (West 1997). But other states such as California and
Pennsylvania are hospitable to surrogacy. See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive
Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS LJ. 911, 924 (1996). For a thorough dis-
cussion of legislative responses to surrogacy, see Christine L Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last
Resort Alternative For Infertile Women or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and
Children? 12 Wis. WomEN's LJ. 113, 142-50 (1997).
173. See, e.g., FwnD, StUocATE MOTHERHOOD, supra note 69; Omolade, supra note 1.
174. Fimm, SUtOAm E MOTHERHOOD, supra note 69, at 61.
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women implicit in this statement parallels the anti-abortion rhetoric
depicting women as having abortions "for convenience."' 75 But just as
very few women choose to have abortions for purely frivolous, cos-
metic reasons, very few, if any, women will hire others to have their
children for them. I cannot picture a rational, healthy woman, capable
of having a normal healthy pregnancy, 76 who is willing to commit
herself to 18 years of childraising, but unwilling to undergo 9 months
of pregnancy. The specter of millions of frivolous, selfish middle-class
women hiring lower-class women to bear their children is unrealistic
and deeply insulting to women. It is hard to believe this picture comes
from women who consider themselves feminists.1
My primary argument about surrogacy is that the experience of
the infertile woman must be factored into the equation. She should
not be invisible or depicted as simply a tool of her husband. It must
be recognized that she is not a monster, deliberately setting out to ex-
ploit poor women of color. 78 I do not contend that adding the
infertile woman's voice to the dialogue will provide easier answers to
complex problems. Surrogacy can be a painful experience for everyone
concerned and ideally should be viewed as a "last resort" for the
childless woman, used only when attempts to conceive or adopt a
child have failed.
V. THE COMMODIFICATION OF CHILDREN THEORY
Opponents of the use of assisted reproductive techniques, especially
in the context of surrogacy, also rely upon the commodification theory.
Although this concept is often linked to the "technology as patriarchal
tool" argument,79 it has an identity of its own. Basically, the theory cen-
ters around the fact that techniques such as IVF are extremely
175. Kristen Luker notes that "pro-life women believe that other women are 'casual' about
abortion and have them 'for convenience.'" KRiSTEN LuIER, ABoRTIoN AND THE
POIxrICS OF MOTHERHOOD 203 (1994).
176. Of course, there will be women who mistakenly exaggerate the health hazards of
pregnancy. However, an unrealistic fear of pregnancy is not the same thing as refus-
ing to become pregnant for convenience.
177. It can be argued that middle-class white women hire black women to take care of
their children, so hiring black women to act as surrogates would just be an extension
of "childraising" duties. This ignores the obvious difference between hiring a tempo-
rary caretaker and conceiving and beating a child.
178. See infra Part VI.
179. See supra Part I.A.
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expensive'80 and that money is generally exchanged for surrogate ar-
rangements.'8 ' Thus both children and women are turned into
marketplace commodities to be bought and sold, robbed of their es-
sential humanity.'
The idea of children being compared to televisions, and being
classified as "first quality" or "second quality," as in Richard Posner's
infamous article advocating baby-selling,'83 is indeed troubling.'84 The
flaw in this analysis is that it focuses on the way children are perceived
by the outside world, not the way they are perceived by their parents.
Real people do not behave the way Richard Posner says they do,'85 and
real parents do not regard their children as objects simply because
money was expended to bring them into their lives. 8' Children be-
come a part of a family, and few people think of a family member as a
commodity. ' Nontraditional parents may not love their children any
more than traditional biological parents, but they certainly do not
love them any less.
180. A study in the New England Journal of Medicine estimated that the actual cost of a
successful 1VF treatment ranges from $67,000 to $114,000. See Roberts, Race, supra
note 98, at 948.
181. There are a few instances in which a woman, who is usually a relative of the prospec-
tive mother, will agree to bear a child for free, but it is generally acknowledged that
most surrogates require money. See Hill, supra note 159, at 692.
182. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L Ray. 1849 (1987); see
alo Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery ofPersonal
Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L Rav. 55 (1994).
183. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics ofthe Baby Shortage, 7
J. LEcAL STUD. 323 (1978).
184. Patricia Williams castigates Posner's approach, yet nevertheless argues that the mar-
ket, permeated with racism, indeed controls the adoption process. See Williams, Spare
Parts, supra note 5, at 913-21.
185. See Robin West, Submission, Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HtAv.
L REv. 1449, 1454-55 (1986).
186. Having a child by the traditional biological method can also be costly, especially if
there are complications in the birth.
187. A recent example of the condemnation people express when a child is treated as a
commodity can be seen in the uproar over Jon-Benet Ramsey's work in beauty pag-
eants. v
Ann Scales says about the murdered child beauty queen, "That little blond
white girl was made into a consumable object when just a baby.... That child was
pimped by her parents, by the pageant industry, and now pervasively by the media."
Ann cales, Disappearing Medwa" The Fate of Feminist Legal Theory, 20 HARV.
WoMEN's LJ. 34, 44-45 (1977). It is important to note that Jon-Benet's mother was
her biological mother.
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VI. RACISM AND ALTERNATIVE MEANS oF FORMING A FAMILY
Many feminists of color are concerned about the racist assump-
tions and dynamics involved in the availability of reproductive
technologies and other alternative methods for forming a family. 8'
Their primary argument is that use of IVF and other technologies by
white parents is motivated by a racist desire for "perfect" white ba-
bies."'89 In contrast, as Lisa Ikemoto points out, our society treats
women of color as "too fertile" and attempts to limit their childbear-
ing." As a result, Dorothy Roberts argues "[T]rading the genetic tie
on the market lays bare the high value placed on whiteness and the
worthlessness accorded blackness."191 This theory is compelling, but
while we may indict a society that values whiteness above blackness,
we should not forget the individual pain suffered by childless women
regardless of race. Motives for wanting a genetically-related child can-
not be neatly categorized as racism.
Consider the following scenarios: A woman sits in a boat in the
middle of a small lake. She is aware that the shoreline of the lake is a
steep dropoff, potentially life threatening to children who cannot
swim. She sees a white child on the north side of the lake approaching
the shoreline, obviously intending to enter the water, and she sees
three black children on the south shore in the same position. It will be
possible for her to reach one, but not both shorelines, in time to pre-
vent the child or children from drowning. All other things being
equal, we would expect the woman to save the three children at the
188. See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Destabilizing Thoughts on Surrogacy Legislation, 28 U.S.F.
L Rnv. 633 (1994) [hereinafter Ikemoto, Destabilizing Thoughts]; Omolade, supra
note 1; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L Rav. 209 (1995);
[hereinafter Roberts, Genetic Tie]; Roberts, Race, supra note 98; Williams, Spare
Parts, supra note 5.
189. See, e.g., Omolade, supra note 1; Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 188; Williams,
Spare Parts, supra note 5. The concerns about racism are especially complex, and I
approach them with trepidation. I am aware that as a white, middle-class woman, my
perspective is limited.
190. See Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, supra note 9, at 1045-53. The racism inherent in the
attack on welfare mothers has been well documented. See, e.g., FiNmmtA, supra note
1, at 101-18; Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Mother-
hood, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L 1 (1993).
191. Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 188, at 210. Most of the discussion in this Article,
and in much of the literature on racism and reproductive technology, focuses on
black women. Obviously other minority women can also be exploited through racist
practices.
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expense of the one. If she chooses to save one white child at the ex-
pense of three black children, we would almost certainly be justified in
describing her actions as racist.
However, the scenario changes dramatically if the child on the
north shore is the woman's daughter and the three children on the
south shore are strangers. Although we may still think that
"objectively" the woman should have saved the three children, most of
us will understand the decision to save her own child's life. Indeed any
other decision would be thought unnatural. This analysis remains
valid regardless of the skin color of the children on the south shore.
The instinct to protect and nurture one's own child is the predomi-
nant emotion and motivating force. 192
The picture changes again if the woman knows that her child on
the north shore is a strong swimmer and her motive for preventing the
child from entering the water is to prevent an expensive outfit from
being ruined. In that situation, a decision to leave the three children
on the south shore to drown would be viewed as unspeakably repre-
hensible, even evil, and certainly racist if the south shore children are
black.
Many theorists writing about race and reproduction implicitly
consider the infertile woman as more like the third mother than the
second. She is viewed as trying to satisfy a frivolous whim, relatively
unimportant in contrast to larger concerns about racism. I believe that
an infertile woman attempting to have children is similar to the
woman trying to save her own child. She is acting out of a deep-seated
emotional need, making all other considerations unimportant. While
there may be valid arguments as to why this need should not always be
satisfied, 93 it should be treated with compassion and respect and not
dismissed as just another example of our racist society.
Analyses of racism and assisted reproduction often focus on the
unique situation of surrogacy. 94 Many feminists fear that, since
women of color are disproportionately poor, legalized surrogacy
would create a sub-class of women of color bearing children for white
192. When I refer to an instinct to nurture one's child, I am not suggesting that this in-
stinct is only present in biological parents. I strongly disagree with the biological
feminist analysis which privileges gestational mothers.
193. These arguments are especially strong in the context of surrogacy, where the pain of
the childless woman must be balanced against the pain of the gestational mother.
194. See supra Part TV.
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women."' A great deal of discussion has centered around Johnson v.
Calvert,19 in which a black woman was hired to bear a child for a
woman who was unable to carry a child to term. The egg of the ge-
netic mother was combined with the sperm of the genetic father. The
resulting zygote was then placed in the womb of Anna Johnson, the
black surrogate.'7' After the birth of the child, Johnson refused to re-
linquish her parental rights. The court eventually granted custody to
the genetic parents; the surrogate mother was denied even visitation
rights.198
Because the genetic father was white, the case is usually analyzed
as a racist privileging of a white patriarch. Lisa Ikemoto describes the
case as "selectively applying the parental status laws to maintain white
fatherhood" 99 and as "eras[ing] black woman's status as wife and
mother."2'
The standard analysis of Johnson has powerful symbolic appeal,
but it ignores a crucial element: the genetic mother, like the surrogate,
was not white. The fact that Crispina Calvert is Filipina is glossedoveror een o ittd inmost" "201
over or even omitted in most discussions of.Johnson. Once again, the
woman expecting to raise the child, and who, in this case, is also the
genetic mother, is virtually invisible. Surely the then-childless
Crispina Calvert, who contributed her egg in an expensive and painful
process, had interests worth discussing as well. If a court had awarded
custody to Johnson and denied Calvert's interest in the child, could
the court not be said to have "erased Filipina women's status as a wife
and mother," just as critics now contend that the court erased black
women's status?
195. See, e.g., Anita L Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HARv. BLAciLKUTrzR. J. 17
(1991); Horsburgh, supra note 166.
196. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
197. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
198. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778, 787.
199. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, supra note 9, at 1025.
200. Ikemoto, The IrnFertile, supra note 9, at 1026.
201. See, e.g., Horsburgh, supra note 166. One of the few discussions of Crispina Calvert
is basically negative. Lisa Ikemoto suggests that stereotypes about Asian women may
have made Crispina the "good" mother as opposed to the black Johnson, the "bad"
mother. Ikemoto describes stereotypical Asian women as "subservient for the sake of
men and their children. They serve white men particularly well." Ikemoto, Destabi-
lizing Thoughts, supra note 188, at 643. Ikemoto implies that Crispina fits this
stereotype because she agreed to her husband's demand for a baby. This assumption
completely ignores the possibility that Crispina strongly desired a child and her hus-
band acted in accordance with this goal.
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Even if Johnson can correctly be viewed as an exercise in judicial
and societal racism, there is no evidence that it is a representative case,
or that its results will be predominant in the future. In addition, there
is no statistical evidence that surrogate mothers are disproportionately
black. In fact, studies show that the average surrogate mother is non-
Hispanic white.202
Theorists also describe adoption as an institution permeated by
racism. 203Adopton is viewed by some as a method to satisfy the desire
of middle-class white parents for white babies, while black parents and
children are shoved aside. 20' The basic proposition-that racism is
present in adoption, as it is in society at large-is hard to refute. But
again the reality of the situation is far more complicated than the
theorists who make broad accusations of racism acknowledge. Con-
trary to the argument that adoption is only for white families, studies
indicate that African-Americans have the "highest rate of adoption
among all ethnic groups" in the United States.205 According to a mi-
nority adoption recruiter at a private adoption agency in the
Washington, D.C. area, the common assertion that there are countless
numbers of healthy black infants waiting for adoption is a myth. She
states, "The fact is, there aren't many healthy black infants available;
we have more families than healthy babies." 206 It is unquestionably
true that a disproportionate number of nonwhite American children
202. Katy Ruth Klinke, The Baby M Controversy. A Class Distinction, 18 Ola. Crr" U. L
Rav. 113, 146 (1993) (discussing a 1983 study that surveyed 125 women who ap-
plied for "surrogacy for money" positions).
203. See, e.g., Twila Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interest Test and the Cost of
Placement, 29 J. FAm. L. 51, 112 (1990); Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 188; Wil-
liams, Spare Parts, supra note 5, at 916-18.
204. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 60; Omolade, supra note 1, at 222. Patricia Williams, in
discussing her experiences in adopting her son, deplores the fee system for adoption,
which places black children in a special, half-price category. See Williams, Spare Parts,
supra note 5, at 918.
205. Sherry Davis Molock, Adoption Barriers for African-American Families, AnoTm
FAmmmas, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 14, 14. Molock also describes a number of the sub-
stantial obstacles that black families face in formally adopting children. Molock, supra
at 14-15.
206. Molock, supra note 205, at 15. Since there are only estimates, and no precise national
statistics on adoptable children, this statement may not be accurate in other areas of
the country. It is impossible to get a definitive number of how many healthy infants
of color are available for adoption, or how many would be adopted if all obstacles
were removed. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
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are in the child welfare system,2' but many of those children are spe-
cial needs children,"' and reluctance to adopt special needs children is
not necessarily attributable to racism.2 9 Studies done of prospective
adoptive families indicate that for most parents, healthy black infants
are preferred over older or handicapped white children.210 Signifi-
candy, white parents are actually more willing than black families to
adopt older and disabled black children. 21  The growing popularity of
international adoptions, most of which are transracial, also attests to
the willingness of adoptive parents to adopt nonwhite children.
The primary obstacle to adoption of minority children is not ra-
cism on the part of adoptive parents, but policies which discourage or
prohibit interracial adoption.213 The National Association of Black
Social Workers has taken the position that black children should never
be placed with white families, even if the alternative is foster care.214
207. See Molock, supra note 205, at 14. The author states: "Although exact numbers are
difficult to obtain, estimates indicate that 42 percent of children in the system are
minorities." Molock, supra note 205, at 14.
208. I use the term special needs in a broad sense, to encompass children with physical or
psychological handicaps. Adoption professionals use the term to describe any child or
child who is hard-to-place.
209. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
210. See David S. Rosettenstein, Trans-RacialAdoption in the United States and the Impact
of Considerations Relating to Minority Population Groups on International Adoptions in
the United States, 9 INT'L J.L. & FA. 131, 133-34 (1995). Another study showed
that of approximately two million white adoptive parents, 68,000 indicated that they
would adopt a minority child. See Rebecca Varan, Desegregating the Adoptive Family:
In Support of the Adoption Antidiscrimination Act of 1995, 30 JoHN MARSHALL L.
Ray. 593, 608-09 (1997).
211. See Varan, supra note 210, at 609 (citing All in the Family, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 24,
1994, at 7).
212. In 1994, there were over 800 intercountry adoptions, an 11% increase from the
previous year. Intercountry Adoptions Up 11 Percent in 1994, Anornvc F!Amms,
Mar./Apr. 1995, at 7. See generally Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of
Children, 23 Tu.sA LJ. 317 (1988), for a thorough discussion of the legal issues
posed by international adoptions.
213. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L Ray. 1163 (1991) [hereinafter Bartholet, Politics
of Race Matching]; Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Dolk Transracial Adoption and
CulturalPreservation, 59 UMKC L. REv. 487 (1991); Rosettenstein, supra note 210,
at 139-42.
214. See Rosettenstein, supra note 210, at 139-40. The organization's statement against
interracial adoption reads in part: "Black children belong physically, psychologically,
and culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total sense of themselves
and develop a sound projection of their future .... Black children in white homes are
cut off from their healthy development of themselves as Black people." JoYC LAN-
DES, MIXED FXmmS 75 (1977).
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Congress has passed legislation prohibiting agencies from using race
to prohibit adoption placements,"1 ' but individual social workers and
adoption professionals may continue to discourage these adoptions.
6
It seems prospective adoptive parents can do no right in the eyes
of some commentators." 7 They are depicted as racist if they do not
adopt minority children, and find their motivations impugned if they
do adopt transracially. For example, Dorothy Roberts writes:
Although it may produce significant connections between par-
ents and their adopted children, the possibility of transracial
215. Section 1808 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 states:
[N]either the State nor any other entity in the State that receives funds
from the Federal Government and is involved in adoption or foster care
placements may-
(A) deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster
parent, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the person, or
of the child, involved; or
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care,
on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster
parent, or child, involved.
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-188 § 1808(a)(3), 110
Stat. 1755, 1903 (1996). For a discussion of this act, see Recent Legislation, Transra-
cia! Adoption-Congress ForbidsUse of Race as a Factor in Adoptive Placement
Decisions, 110 HARv. L REv. 1352 (1997).
216. One advocate of interracial adoption states, "[It is easy for the adoption professionals
to hide race among the array of factors they allegedly used in their highly subjective
and discretionary assessment of what placement was in the 'best interest of the
child.'" Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 213, at 1192 n.73.
217. The debate about the desirability of transracial adoption continues in academic lit-
erature. See, e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption ofBlack
Children, 10 -RIv. L. BIAcKL TMR J. 39, 51 (1993) (opposing transracial adoption
as the "quick and easy solution to accelerate the placement of Black children in per-
manent homes" while acknowledging that transracial "adoption should be an integral
part of a holistic solution"); Kim Forde-Mazuri, Note, Black Identity and Child
Placement:. The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MiCH. L Rnv. 925
(1994) (generally supporting interracial adoption); Randall Kennedy, Orphans of
Separatism: The Politics of Transracial Adoption, Cuam-N, Oct. 1994, at 8
(supporting transracial adoption). For a thoughtful artide written from the perspec-
tive of an interracial adoptee, see Asher D. Isaacs, Interracial Adoption: Permanent
Placement and Racial Identity--An Adoptee's Persective, 14 NAL BLACK U. 126
(1995).
There are strong arguments on both sides of the debate. After reading most of
the arguments, my condusion is that race should be considered as a factor in adop-
tion placement, but race matching should not prohibit a timely placement of an
adoptable child.
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adoptions within a racial caste system nevertheless reminds me
of bell hooks's [sic] description of whites' appropriation of
pieces of Black culture. hooks examines the ways in which
whites incorporate certain elements of blackness into their
own lives in order to assuage their guilt for past injustices or
to add a new element of excitement to their lives.218
Roberts seems to suggest that white adoptive parents regard their
black children as simply live versions of African masks which trendy
liberals use to decorate their living room walls. The intense love most
adoptive parents feel for their children is dismissed as a second-class
"significant connection."
CONCLUSION
This has been the most difficult Article I have ever written. I have
enormous respect for most of the authors I have discussed and I was
initially reluctant to criticize them. But when I read their work on as-
sisted reproductive issues, I am reminded of Sojourner Truth's cry
"Ain't I a Woman?" I want to shout "Ain't I a Mother?" My children
did not grow inside my body, but I could not love them any more if
they had. Infertile women deserve empathy, not scorn or dismissal.
Those of us who finally become parents through nontraditional means
are not imposters who only "construct" ourselves as mothers.
The dominant feminist "story" about artificial reproduction is
the story of the dominant patriarchal male, who uses technology to
both reproduce himself and control women. My story is written from
the perspective of the childless woman who uses technology to fulfill
her wish to bring children into her life. There is undoubtedly truth in
both stories. Feminists who lack understanding of the infertile woman
and her need for children should acquaint themselves with the previ-
ously unheard voices of the childless. Without these voices, any
analysis of assisted reproduction and adoption is incomplete. t
218. Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 188, at 266-67 (citations omitted).
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